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Abstract
In this paper we consider data from a large number of economic experiments,
and look for demographic eﬀects that may be a source of subject pool bias if not
carefully accounted for in the subsequent statistical analysis. Our dataset contains
information on 2,408 subjects and 597 experimental sessions from 74 experiments
recorded over more than 2 years at an experimental laboratory. Using diﬀerent es-
timation methods and model speciﬁcations, we identify the signiﬁcant demographic
determinants of personal earnings, and ﬁnd that they account for less than 4% of the
observed variation. Thus we deliver empirical evidence supporting the experimental
method as monetary incentives, and therefore some kind of strategic behavior, seem
to be more important than demographics in the laboratory. Exploiting the time-
series nature of the data we also study some dynamic issues of the subject pool: we
analyze the factors that inﬂuence subjects’ decisions on returning to the laboratory.
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11 Introduction
A frequent criticism of experimental economics is that the behavior investigated in ex-
periments is speciﬁc to the particular group of subjects, such as college students, who
frequently participate in the laboratory. Is this a serious problem for the experimental
method, and can it be rectiﬁed by including a wider range of subjects in experiments
and/or controlling for a possible demographic bias in the statistical analysis? In this
paper we consider data from a large number of economic experiments and look for demo-
graphic eﬀects that may be a source of subject pool bias if not carefully accounted for in
the subsequent data analysis.
The experimental method, though present from the early ’30s in economics, has en-
joyed a steady increase and wider acceptance in science over the last decades. Nevertheless
it often receives harsh criticism that attacks its fundamentals. The essence of experiments
is control as the experimenter is able to keep track of the environmnet, and also of the
exogenous and endogenous variables except for a few unobservable ones. Falk and Fehr
(2003) discuss brieﬂy the most important lines of criticism including those that focus on
low stakes, small number of participants, and unrealistic environments. They list refer-
ences, and describe the most important results from experimental research that have been
gathered to respond to critics. In this paper we wish to contribute to this discussion by
studying the possible existence of subject pool bias. Our approach is novel in the sense
that it is based on historical data rather than data recorded from a new and speciﬁcally
design experiment.
The historical feature of the data implies that we lack precise information on the
environment implemented in the laboratory. We focus on the monetary amount that
subjects earn in the experiment, and try to establish connection between it and subjects’
personal characteristics. This type of investigation usually does not appear in research
outputs, except for those papers that report results from experiments designed precisely
for measuring the gender, university, etc. eﬀects. Roth et al. (1991) for example report
results from bargaining and market behavior experiments run in four culturally very
diﬀerent countries: Israel, Japan, the United States of America, and Yugoslavia. They ﬁnd
2important deviations from predicted behavior, but no payoﬀ-relevant diﬀerences among
countries.
The use of the money earned in the experiment as a proxy for the subject’s perfor-
mance relies on the fact that experiments in economics are based on monetary incentives.
Participants usually earn a ﬁxed amount (show-up fee) plus some additional, and in gen-
eral more voluminous, amount that is determined by their actions and behavior in the
experiment. After the critiques presented by Allen Wallis and Milton Friedman in 1942
pointing out that Thurstones’s early experimental session in 1931 involved ill speciﬁed
and hypothetical choices, experimenters started using real incentives, in the vast majority
of cases money.1
We investigate whether certain groups of subjects systematically earn higher payoﬀs
than others, using administrative data on 2,408 diﬀerent subjects gathered at an exper-
imental laboratory at a university in the Northeastern United States over the course of
approximately two and a half years. We focus on payoﬀs since this is the easiest way
of comparing behavior across large numbers of experiments, and therefore of deciding
whether experiments (and the subsequent data analysis) in general should be structured
to include a wider range of subjects (and control variables).
We ﬁnd that while subjects’ age and gender seem to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
ﬁnal payoﬀs, experience and education do not. The divergence of payments between two
groups is a necessary but not suﬃcient condition for the divergence in behavior. That is, if
the payoﬀs of the two groups are signﬁcantly diﬀerent, we can conclude that their behavior
must also have been diﬀerent, but not the converse. Small diﬀerences in average payoﬀs,
in fact, could correspond to large diﬀerences in behavior. Our ﬁnding that payoﬀs diﬀer
across diﬀerent groups therefore provides evidence that behavior is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
across these groups. Since we lack precise information on the environment implemented in
the laboratory, our results aggregate over large numbers of diﬀerent types of experiments.
This provides a possible caveat against generalizing the results of an experiment to too
wide range of other possible subject pools.
Nevertheless, subjects’ demographic characteristics account for less than 4% of the
1For more on the history of experiments in economics check Roth (1995).
3observed variation in payoﬀs. We are aware of experimental results about important dif-
ferences between the behavior of men and women.2 The point we would like to make here
is that once we consider a large variety of problems and situations, even if gender seems
to mark a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in subjects’ performance, its absolute impact is negligi-
ble when compared to other variables. Experiment and experimental session dummies
explain a large fraction (approximately 40%) of the observed variation. This gives us
some conﬁdence that subject pool eﬀects are not very important in explaining payoﬀs.
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that these small diﬀerences in average payoﬀs could corre-
spond to larger diﬀerences in average behavior in any given experimental setup. We are
also aware of the fact that a large fraction of the variance in payoﬀs may be explained by
subject charactertics that we did not include explicitly in our regressions.3
In a very similar way to ours, Carbone (2005) attempts to establish a link between
strategic behavior and demographic characteristics. Her analysis uses a unique experi-
mental subject pool that participated in a life-cycle consumption experiment. She ﬁnds
that demographics have no eﬀect on observed behavior, which she interprets as a con-
structive message to economic theory, which often ignores the eﬀect of demographics on
behavior. Our analysis is very diﬀerent, as we look at historical data on a very large num-
ber of experimental sessions, none of which was designed to investigate the link between
demographics and behavior, rather than relying on data from one experimental session
speciﬁcally designed for probing this link.
Some recent work has been done on studying how representative experimental ﬁndings
are. These papers, however similar to ours in their philosophy, concentrate on diﬀerent
issues, namely external validity.4 Harrison and List (2004) presents an extensive survey
on the criticism that points at the impact of students being the most important group for
building the subject pool for laboratory experiments. The paper proposes a taxonomy
2Gneezy et al. (2003), for example, found that women may be less eﬀective than men in competitive
environments.
3Nevertheless, in section 3 we do present results from regressions that control for personal ﬁxed eﬀects
without explicitly pointing out which are the most important, i.e. inﬂuential, personal characteristics.
4For clariﬁcation purpuses, we include here the deﬁnition for external and internal validity from Brewer
(2000). An experiment is said to possess external validity if the experiment’s results hold across diﬀerent
experimental settings, procedures and participants. While an experiment is said to possess internal
validity if it properly demonstrates a causal relation between two variables.
4for ﬁeld experiments and suggests that experiments be run in both ways. In this line,
Benz and Meier (2006) are the ﬁrst to directly compare how people (actually the same
subjects) behave in the lab and in the ﬁeld. They use a simple donation example and ﬁnd
that even if there is a signiﬁcant positive correlation between the lab and ﬁeld behavior,
it is very small and therefore it seems to be diﬃcult predict real-life behavior based on
experimental data. List and Levitt (2005) study the question of what experimenters can
learn about the real world using laboratory experiments. They develop a simple model
and argue that being watched in the lab may distort subject’s behavior in various ways.
As for self-selection into the subject pool, List and Levitt (2005) believe that people
“who have social preferences or readily cooperate with the experimenter and seek social
approval” might more frequently volunteer for experimental studies. While recognizing
the importance of this issue, we do not consider it in our analysis, because our data comes
from the experimental lab and does not allow for comparisons with external, out-of-the-lab
subject groups. On the other hand, we do wish to contribute to the point raised by List
and Levitt (2005) on experiments that measure group diﬀerences. Since the observations
in our analysis proceed from a large number of potentially very diﬀerent experimental
sessions, the bias introduced by subjects who tend to please the experimenter can be
neglected. We look at statistical diﬀerences in the behavior of subjects from diﬀerent
groups according to their gender, race, and/or education; nevertheless the vast majority
of the experimental sessions that produced the observations in our data was not especially
designed to study such diﬀerences. It must be pointed out that our results do not directly
support the external validity of laboratory experiments in economics. However, they do
support their internal validity. In particular we can claim that experimental results seem
to be only very slightly aﬀected by spurious demographic variables.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes our dataset. Section 3 presents
the details of the statistical analysis that was performed on it. Section 4 concludes. Tables
are in the appendix.
52 Data
Our data set consists of 8,755 observations corresponding to 2,408 subjects who partici-
pated in 597 sessions from 74 diﬀerent experiments. All data come from the same labo-
ratory located at a university in the Northeastern United States. We use entries recorded
after April, 2003, because that is the month when the laboratory started gathering par-
ticipants’ personal data on a regular basis. The latest observations that we include in this
analysis were gathered in January, 2006. The data available includes various self-reported
personal characteristics of the subjects, including their gender, age, and the university (if
any) they are aﬃliated with, along with their payoﬀ in the experiment.
In some experiments, the subject’s payoﬀ does not depend, or depends very little, on
the subject’s behavior. Since our objective is to check how important personal character-
istics are in determining the ﬁnal payment in the experiment, we have deleted data from
those sessions with ﬁxed payoﬀs or in which payments do not vary much. In particular,
we decided to exclude all the sessions in which 80% or more of the participants receive
the same amount of money.5 We have not discovered important qualitative changes in the
results when performing the same analysis using cutoﬀs of 50%, 90% and 100%, instead
of 80%. We have also deleted records with zero registered payoﬀ, and repeated entries,
keeping the one with the highest payoﬀ. These two categories are a result of faulty data
entries: no subject actually received zero payoﬀ, and no subject was paid more than once
for the same participation. We found a total of 176 zero entries and 277 repeated entries.
This leaves 8,755 observations in our dataset.6
5This selection is in line with the philosophy of regression analysis we perform on the data, since
ignoring ﬁxed and quasi ﬁxed payments guarantees larger variance in our dependent variable. As a
result, we eﬀectively exclude most tournament experiments, and also those sessions with ﬁxed payments
in which a few of the subjects earned more money, due to the ”early show-up fee” that rewards people
who arrive at experiments early with an extra payment. Moreover, we present our statistical analysis
considering both raw and standardized payoﬀs. The standardization process subtracts the (per session)
average payment from individual payoﬀs, hence eliminates the common part, such as the ﬁxed show-up
fee.
6The laboratory has recently started collecting information on subjects’ ethnic group. As there are
only 4,559 (52.97%) entries that contain a value for this variable, in order to not reduce the number
of observations in the analysis we have decided not to include this variable in the ﬁnal data set. If we
compare the mean payoﬀs across the nine ethnic groups using analysis of variance (ANOVA) tables we
cannot reject the null hypothesis of them being equal. The p-value in this case is of 0.1398, and of 0.4940
if we compare standardized payoﬀs across sessions.
6Apart from the recorded personal data such as age, gender, racial group, educational
level (with intended major and the name of the college), and the basic characteristics of
the experimental session (ﬁnal payoﬀ, type of experiment), we also created several vari-
ables for our empirical analysis. Of the 2,408 subjects in the data, 70% came more than
once to the laboratory over the course of the period we investigate. In order to control
for experience, i.e. training in experiments, we constructed three variables. EXPERI-
ENCE TOTAL counts the total number of occasions the subject appears in the database
prior to the experimental session in question. EXPERIENCE INCENTIVES counts only
experiments that make the 80% cutoﬀ described earlier. The third experience variable,
EXPERIENCE ANY, is dichotomous and takes the value 1 if the subject appears in the
database prior to the given record, and 0 otherwise. It turns out that subjects who par-
ticipate in experiments have a long experience record: At the time of our analysis they
have participated in more than 6 sessions on average (in almost 5 if we solely consider in-
centives based experiments). This number is in line with the usual concern on the validity
of experimental results as explained in List and Levitt (2005) who discuss the problem of
subjects’ self-selection into experiments. Section 3.3 oﬀers a detailed statistical analysis
of return decisions.
Since we shall be comparing earning from diﬀerent experiments conducted by diﬀer-
ent researchers and therefore diﬀerent incentives schemes, we generated the standardized
series of payments, ST EARNING AMT. We corrected by the mean and the variance
estimated for the same session.7
The variables RETURN30/60/90/365 take value 1 if the subject returns to appear in
an experiment in the subsequent 30, 60, 90 and 365 days, respectively.8
Tables 1, 2 and 3 display descriptive statistics on all the variables included in our
analysis. The picture that these tables reﬂect are typical for laboratory experiments in
economics. The vast majority (74.04%) of the subjects are college students, and almost
82% have experience in experiments by the time of participation. The largest share comes
7The formula that we applied for this correction is the following one: ST EARNING AMT =
EARNING AMTis−mean(EARNING AMT)s
st.dev.(EARNING AMT)s , where subindex i makes reference to subjects, while s to the
experimental session.
8In order to eliminate the survivorship bias from our analysis we have cut the dataset eliminating
observations from the last 30, 60, 90 and 365 days.
7from the area of social sciences, though other specialities as humanities or natural sciences
are also well represented. Participants earn roughly $24 on average. The distribution of
payoﬀs is positively skewed as income distributions tend to be. It shows a large variance,
since its standard deviation is approximately $9. The subject pool of the experimental
laboratory that we study seems to be well-trained, as subjects have experience from more
than 6 experiments on average (in almost 5 if we consider only incentive-based session).
3 Subject pool bias
This section present the main results of the statistical analysis that we performed on the
database. The ﬁrst subsection gives a preliminary insight into the structure of the data.
It deals with parametric and non-parametric pairwise comparisons across diﬀerent subject
groups and complements the descriptives statistics reported in the previous section. The
second subsection contains the main body of our numerical results. With the help of
regression analysis it oﬀers empirical evidence suggesting that personal characteristics,
that are usually excluded from the analysis of experimental data, although may have
signiﬁcant inﬂuence on subjets’ performance, they altogether account for less than 4% of
the observed variation in monetary payoﬀs. Before proceeding to the results a comment
is in order: in spite of its historical nature we treat our observations as panel data and use
statistical tools accordingly. Nevertheless, the variables that proxy subjects’ experience
are able to capture some of the dynamics features in the determination of monetary
payoﬀs.
3.1 Pairwise comparisons
We grouped our data according the categorical variables and performed both parametric
and non-parametric comparisons between groups.9 Tables 4 through 8 contain the detailed
numerical results. Our tables report results on comparisons between groups taking into
account payoﬀs, EARNING AMT, and also standardized payoﬀs, ST EARNING AMT.
9Group means are compared using t-tests that handle possible diﬀerences in group variances. Distri-
butions are compared by the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test.
8Numbers above the diagonal refer to real money payoﬀs, while numbers below the diagonal
refer to standardized ones. All diﬀerences are computed by subtracting the group mean in
column from the group mean in row. The diﬀerences reported in the text are signiﬁcant
at least at 5% signiﬁcance level if not stated otherwise.
It turns out that men tend to earn signiﬁcantly more money than women, as male
participants gained 44 cents more on average than females. This diﬀerence and also its
signiﬁcance resist standardization, i.e. correction for session mean and variance does not
change its sign. The non-parametric test also suggests that the two groups according to
gender are diﬀerent at any usual signiﬁcance level.10
As for subjects’ education we treat those seven colleges that most frequently appear
in the database separately, and group the others together under the name of “other”.
Little more than 70% of the observations belong to these seven. Subjects self-report their
college status. Therefore, we can presume but not aﬃrm that subjects who do not report
any college are not students.
When comparing the average payment between the groups of university students and
non students we observe that students earned 86 cents more in average terms, however
the diﬀerence in standardized payoﬀs is merely of 0.0284 and loses signiﬁcance with re-
spect to the previously reported one. The corresponding p-value is 22,96%. We cannot
discover any clear pattern when comparing the above mentioned seven colleges separately.
Without controlling for other variables two eﬀects seem to be persistent in the data both
in money payments and standardized ones: subjects who have not reported college, i.e.
non-students, earn signiﬁcantly less, and interestingly MIT students seem to outperform
everybody else.11
One may think that diﬀerences in the type of education are more important in deter-
mining payoﬀs than the name of the college itself. We compared the payoﬀs accordingly
taking into account subjects’ intended major. Table 5 reports the results. There is some
evidence showing that students from social sciences outperform their fellows from hu-
manities in monetary payoﬀs. The former group earned 63 cents more on average (6
standardized cents) than the latter. However we could not ﬁnd any other meaningful and
10We refer to any signiﬁcance level that is higher or equal than 1%.
11MIT is the abbreviation for Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
9statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence.
We also compared payoﬀs across groups with diﬀerent educational degrees. Our con-
clusion is that there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences especially if we consider standardized
payoﬀs. However, those with a doctoral degree tend to earn less in absolute monetary
terms.12 This result is especially surprising if we note that this signiﬁcant diﬀerence is
fairly large, it amounts to $1.4-2 on average. On the other hand we should be careful
with the interpretation, since we have only 122 subjects with a doctoral degree in our
data base. Therefore, it should be underlined that our sample is not representative in this
sense, and this result can not be generalized.
Experiments on decision making usually involve hypothetical situations in which sub-
jects are meant to solve some underlying numeric problems. Intuition suggests that the
rules speciﬁc to incentive-based experiments in economics may give advantage to those
participants that have participated before in any similar game. Therefore experience may
exert important inﬂuence on payoﬀs. Once again, pairwise comparisons oﬀer empirical
support to this opinion, as those who have participated in any experiment before tend
to earn signiﬁcantly more than those who take part in their ﬁrst experiment. The diﬀer-
ence is of almost 75 cents in average terms, and of 0.0502 when considering standardized
payoﬀs. Also based on a non-parametric test we can conclude that the two groups are
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent with regard to their earnings.
Finally we wish to comment on the payoﬀ comparison according to racial groups. As
outlined in the previous section, due to technical reasons and the lack of suﬃcient data, we
do not include categorical variables encoding race in our analysis. Pairwise comparisons
shed some light on signiﬁcant diﬀerences. It turns out that black participants earned
roughly $1.2 less than white or hispanic. Standardization eliminates these diﬀerences
from the data, therefore we believe that ignoring ethnic groups does not introduce bias
in our results.
12This diﬀerence, just like all the signiﬁcant diﬀerences in absolute terms, disappears if we consider
standardized payoﬀs.
103.2 Regression analysis: payoﬀs
Our main objective is to examine whether personal characteristics have any explanatory
power in the determination of experimental earnings. And also whether they introduce
any bias in the subject pool that is usually not controlled for in experimental studies.
We also would like to separate the eﬀects that these variables might have, therefore we
proceed to regression analysis. This subsection deals with the determination of payoﬀs,
while the following one concentrates on return decisions.
The categorical variables enter in form of dichotomous variables in the analysis. GEN-
DER is the dummy for gender (1 represents male), while the variables U1 through U8
encode colleges.13
Tables 9 through 12 show the estimation results for a linear regression model that
explains the observed variation in real money earnings. We use the standard ordinary
least squares method (OLS) and also median regression (MEDIAN) as a robustness test.14
The columns preﬁxed by SW report output from stepwise estimation that select the
most inﬂuential regressors, or in other words the variables with the largest explanatory
power. This procedure enters all the potential and available explanatory variables in the
estimation and proceeds to the stepwise elimination of those that do not prove to be
signiﬁcant.15 In order to account for unobservable subject, session or experiment related
eﬀects we studied several speciﬁcations of our regression model including so-called ﬁxed
eﬀects. The tables in the appendix report these results in columns with the title ROBUST,
since we used the OLS estimation method with robust variance estimates. We check for
an age eﬀect using both age (AGE) and it squared value (AGE2) as regressors as this is
the usual model speciﬁcation in the literature.
According to the information in tables 9 through 12 age has a negative eﬀect on
13The control group is formed by non-student participants. The value 1 belongs to the following
institutions. U1: other college; U2: University of Massachusetts; U3: Tufts University; U4: Northeastern
University; U5: Boston College; U6: Boston University; U7: Harvard University; U8: MIT.
14The quantile regression methods, and in particular the median regression, take into account some
ﬂaws of the data itself and are more robust to outliers. The latter oﬀers an estimation method of the
conditional median function. Similarly to the OLS technique, the estimates of the median regression
result from an optimization process: they minimize the sum of absolute deviations. As an advantage to
the OLS method this method does not require distributional assumptions on the error term.
15We used 15% signiﬁcance level in the elimination process.
11payoﬀs. The coeﬃcient estimates for these two variables give a negative net eﬀect in the
range form 18 to 73, except for the ﬁrst four ROBUST estimation results in tables 11
and 12.16 In those cases the net eﬀect in question turns positive at age 42, 50, 47 and
52, respectively. Nevertheless, these estimated joint eﬀects of AGE and AGE2 are not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, and we also should note that 95.99% of the subjects that
appear in our database are aged 42 or less.
Experience does not seem to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on earnings, nor individually
when taking into account the three variables designed for capturing this eﬀect, nor jointly.
However the dummy variable EXPERIENCE ANY that measures whether the subject has
any experience in experiments or not is close to being signiﬁcant. We shall return to this
point when estimating the model with standardized payoﬀs.
In tables 9 and 10, from the list of colleges Boston College and MIT excel by their
dummies having signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on earnings. Student coming from the former
tend to earn as much as approximately $2.5-4 more on average then the others, while
students from the latter make approximately $1-2 more. However, the variables associated
to education fail to prove to have signiﬁcant eﬀect on earning if we use a joint test.
According to our regression analysis gender is a signiﬁcant characteristic, since men
earn on average roughly 50 cents more (per session) than women. Overall, in spite of the
detected explanatory power of some of the personal characteristics, these account for less
than 1% of the observed variation in real money payoﬀs.
If we reestimate our model allowing for subject ﬁxed eﬀects, the model performs
slightly better as the adjusted R2 increases to 4% once adjusted for the increased number
of variables.17 Age continually shows a signiﬁcant negative sign, while the three variables
attached to experience together are not signiﬁcant. The changes in the absolute values of
the coeﬃcient estimates are diﬃcult to address due to the presence of idiosyncratic terms
in the model.
Results are more interesting if we enter the experimental session as control to the
model. By allowing for experimental session related ﬁxed eﬀects the explanatory power
16These are the minimum and maximum ages for subjects that appear in the database.
17Dummies related to gender and education are dropped, because their eﬀects are now captured by the
ﬁxed terms in the regression.
12of the model increases to more than 40%. We wish to present this result as an im-
portant numeric rationale, apart from the intuitive verbal one presented before, for the
standardization of monetary payoﬀs across sessions. By subtracting the mean payment
and correcting by the variance in each session we clean the data from the session, i.e.
experimental design, related eﬀects. In spite of the guidelines of the experimental labo-
ratory, researchers may diﬀer according to the rules they apply regarding show-up fees,
early show-up fees, and conversion rules that translate experimental monetary units into
real money in their sessions. The regression models that control for session ﬁxed eﬀects
suggest that apart from being an MIT student no other personal (demographic) character-
istic has signiﬁcant inﬂuence on earnings. However, if we look at the other speciﬁcations
there seem to exist gender and age eﬀects. Moreover the parameter estimates for these
regressors do not suﬀer considerable changes in sign or absolute value from one model
and/or estimation method to the other. Note that we also report results from regressions
in which the experiment, i.e. a particular study, enters as a control variable. It is im-
portant to take into account that an experiment usually comprises several sessions which
may correspond to diﬀerent treatments or variations. In particular, AGE and GENDER
are signiﬁcant if we allow for experiment ﬁxed eﬀects in the analysis. Their importance
is also conﬁrmed by the analysis of standardized payoﬀs.
Tables 11 and 12 present results for the models that include the standardized payoﬀ
as the dependent variable. We observe that with this change ﬁxed eﬀects, related to
subjects or experimental sessions, lose importance. The adjusted R2 statistics takes the
value of approximately 1%. This is an upper limit also for the other model speciﬁcations
estimated with ST EARNING AMT. This conﬁrms that personal characteristics have
little importance on determination of payoﬀs in experiments. The primary forces in that
are others, possibly the studied strategic behavior of subjects that is usually reported in
research papers.
Age and gender keep their signiﬁcance and do not alter their sign across diﬀerent
speciﬁcations and estimation methods, and also their absolute value appears to be robust
to these changes. Younger participants tend to earn more and so do males compared to
females. The joint eﬀect of the experience variables improves on its signiﬁcance, the cor-
13responding p-value is equal to 0.164 that is comparable to the 0.871 from the model with
EARNING AMT as dependent variable. The eight dummies associated with education do
not altogether play a signiﬁcant role in determining standardized payoﬀs. Nevertheless, if
the stepwise estimation method is implemented apart from age and gender there are two
other explanatory variables that survive the elimination. MIT students excel from the
subject pool by earning signiﬁcantly more than other student or non-student participants.
The regressor EXPERIENCE ANY has a positive coeﬃcient that conﬁrms the intuitive
fact that experience has a positive eﬀect on payoﬀs. In other words, having participated in
an experiment before is important and positively inﬂuences the money earned. However
experience is not cumulative, as participation in more than one experiment in the past
does not have additional eﬀects.
Since experimenters are asked to ﬁll in a questionnaire about the study they wish to
perform in the laboratory, we have information on the type of the game that was played
by participants. Experiments however often fall in more than one category. For this
reason, instead of introducing new dummy variables into the analysis, we re-estimated
the models with data from diﬀerent types of experiments, and looked for variations in
the results. The only remarkable novelty from this approach is the impact of experience
on the monetary payoﬀ. Especially because it turns out to be signiﬁcant in the following
types of games: public goods, coordination, decision-making under risk, organizational
behavior and studies on altruism, fairness and reciprocity.18
Before closing the section two comments are in order. On one hand, as previously
mentioned in the introduction, the laboratory has recently started to collect data on
subjects’ ethnic groups. We decided not to include this variable in our analysis, because
it would have reduced the number of observations dramatically. Only 4,559 out of 8,755
entries contain a value for the ethnic group. Howeveer, we replicated the regression
analysis described in this section with dummies controlling for the ethnic groups, and
found that the new speciﬁcation did not help to raise the value of the R2 statistics over 1%.
Moreover, we can not give clear interpretation to the alternative coeﬃcient estimates, since
most variables lose their explanatory power both individually and jointly with the new
18In order to save space we did not include the detailes regression results in the paper.
14speciﬁcation. On the other hand, our tests on heteroskedasticity can not deliver enough
evidence to reject the null of homoskedasticity, especially if we consider standardized
payoﬀs.19 This is an important fact as it suggests that subjects in the same demographic
group tend to behave in a homogeneous manner. More precisely, the variance of the
payoﬀs does not seem to change from one group to the other according to any of the
demographic variables that we consider.
3.3 Regression analysis: return decisions
The self-selection among subjects who show up in the experimental lab could introduce
an important bias in the experimental analysis. In this subsection we show that it is not
the case as we obtain a positive result that is similar to the one in the previous subsection.
It turns out that although some personal characteristics have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
return decision, they are not able to explain more than 2% of the decisions.20 We have
run logit regression, with and without subject and session speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects, in order
to explain the decision on returning to the experimental lab in the next 30, 60, 90 and 365
days. As described before, dummy variables called RETURNXXX have been constructed
to transform these decisions into numerical data. It is important to note that during this
process we have ignored the last 30, 60, 90 and 365 days. With this we avoid the so called
survivorship bias. The reason for it is that we can not know whether those observation
belong to subject who wish to (and actually do) return to the lab in the future or not.
Tables 13 and 14 oﬀer the detailed estimation and test results. We observe that the
payoﬀ plays an important role, as it has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the logit.
It is the payoﬀ in US dollars and not its standardized version, since subject are usually
paid individually and privately. That is, they do not have concise information to make
intersubject comparisons. Age turns out to be signiﬁcant in some speciﬁcations, however
it net eﬀect on the logit is ambiguous. Once again if we restrict our attention solely on
the signiﬁcant estimates and subjects aged 50 or less, we conclude that younger people
tend to return in the long run. So do males. As for universities, in the long run many of
19Tables 9 through 12 report p-values for the White, and Breusch-Pagan tests for heteroskedasticity.
20To be precise, there is one regression on long term return decisions that reaches 5.8%. We shall come
back to it later.
15the dummy variables have signiﬁcant positive eﬀects. Some of them can be explained by
simple geographic reasons, as the experimental lab whose data we are looking at is located
closer to some universities than to others. On the other hand, laboratory experiments on
decision making are known to build their subject pool using college students in general.
The main reasons for this are that student subjects are available, easy to recruit, cheap,
and can cope well with hypothetical decision making situations presented in the lab. One
would expect a high correlation between the fact of being a student and the decision of
returning to the lab on a voluntary basis. Pearson’s χ2 conﬁrms such a relationship at
any usual signiﬁcance level, however Cramer’s V statistics indicates that the association
is very low.21 List and Levitt (2005) argue that subjects self-select into experiments, and
therefore people who are more interested in the announced research topic are more likely
to participate. In line with this, as reported in table 3, the typical participant is a college
student with a major in social sciences. Nevertheless logit regressions do not conﬁrm these
eﬀects. The obtained educational level and the intended major do not have signiﬁcant
inﬂuence on any of the studied return decisions.22
It is interesting, although plausible, that the short-term return decisions seem to be
more random than long-term ones. The R2 statistics are much larger if we consider a
possible returning in one year as compared to 30, 60 and 90 days. The logit regression of
RETURN365 with subject speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect is the most capable of explaining variation
in the dependent variable. In this case demographics and the money earned in the previous
session account for almost 6% of the observed variation. However, the largest part of it
is explained by other factors and variables.
21Our data conﬁrms the sign of the suspected association, i.e. students tend to return, but Cramer’s
V is computed to be around 10%. It is equal to 10.63%, 10.52%, 10.02%, and 12.94% for the variables
RETURN30/60/90 and 365 respectively.
22We have estimated the regressions with the categorical variables for education and/or major, but
could not identify signiﬁcant relations. Given these results, and due to considerations of length, the
estimation outputs are omitted.
164 Conclusion
The validity of research results in experimental economics is often questioned based on an
alleged subject pool bias. We use data coming from a single laboratory comprising 8,755
observations coming from a variety of incentive based economic experiments to ﬁnd out
that demographic diﬀerences can explain only 4% of the variations on payments in the
best case. When controlling for experimental sessions we are able to explain roughly 40%
of the variations on payments. We think that this indicates that some kind of strategic
behavior seems to be more important than demographics in the laboratory.
Nevertheless, some of our pairwise comparisons of groups, e.g. between males and
females, are statistically signiﬁcant. Therefore, it seems to be a good practice to routinely
study demographic, and in particular gender, eﬀects in the data analysis. If one does
not ﬁnd them important after a careful statistical and economic analysis, they can be
disregarded.
Our analysis also addresses the question of self-selection within the subject pool we
analyze. Some demographic variables turn out to be signiﬁcant when explaining the
decision to participate again in a lab experiment. However, they are not able to explain
more than 2% of the short term or roughly 6% of the long term decisions.
It has to be pointed out that our study does not directly support the external validity
of economic experiments, as we do not have data on how the studied subjects behave in
the ﬁeld. However, our ﬁndings do support internal validity. In particular we claim that
experimental results seem to be only slightly aﬀected by spurious demographic variables.
References
[1] Benz, M. and Meier, S. (2006), Do People Behave in Experiments as in Real Life? -
Evidence from Donations, mimeo.
[2] Brewer, M. (2000), Research Design and Issues of Validity, In Reis, H. and Judd, C.
(eds), Handbook of Research Methods in Social and Personality Psychology. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
17[3] Carbone, E. (2005), Demographics and Behaviour, Experimental Economics, 8: 217-
232
[4] Falk, A. and Fehr, E. (2003), Why Labour Market Experiments?, Labour Economics,
10: 399-406
[5] Gneezy, U., Niederle, M. and Rustichini, A. (2003), Performance in Competitive En-
vironments: Gender Diﬀerences, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 3: 1049-1074
[6] Harrison, G.W. and List J.A. (2004), Field Experiments, Journal of Economic Liter-
ature 42: 1009-1055
[7] List, J.A. and Levitt, S.T. (2005), What Do Laboratory Experiments Tell Us about
the Real World?, mimeo
[8] Roth, A.E., Prasnikar, V., Okuno-Fujiware, M. and Zamir, S. (1991), Bargaining and
Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh and Tokyo: an Experimental
Study, American Economic Review, 81: 1068-1095
[9] Roth, A.E. (1995), Introduction to Experimental Economics, The Handbook of Exper-
imental Economics, John H. Kagel and Alvin E. Roth, editors, Princeton University
Press, 1995.
18A Tables
Table 1: Sample descriptives: Continuous numerical variables.
All variables are measured in their natural units. AGE: years. EARNING AMT: US dollars.
ST EARNING AMT: standardized US dollars. EXPERIENCE: number of experimental ses-
sions.
AGE EARN. AMT ST EARN. AMT EXPERIENCE
TOTAL INCENTIVES
mean 23.56 23.80 0.00 6.47 4.80
std. dev. 7.14 8.85 0.97 7.78 5.87
skewness 3.20 1.95 0.25 2.07 2.16
kurtosis 14.87 13.42 3.42 8.27 9.06
min 18 0.00 −4.82 0 0
max 73 127.00 4.82 53 43
obs. 8706 8755 8755 8755 8755
Table 2: Sample descriptives: Categorical variables.
Number of observations (#), and proportion (%) of the population that belongs to each category
listed on the left.
UNIVERSITY # % RETURN # %
Boston College 54 0.62 30: yes 4810 54.94
Boston University 1073 12.26 30: no 3637 41.54
Harvard University 4171 47.64 30: N/A 308 3.52
MIT 355 4.05 60: yes 5034 57.50
Northeastern Univ. 194 2.22 60: no 2833 32.36
Tufts University 214 2.44 60: N/A 888 10.14
Univ. of Massachusetts 83 0.95 90: yes 4891 55.87
other 338 3.86 90: no 2383 27.22
not reported 2273 25.96 90: N/A 1481 16.92
EXPERIENCE ANY 365: yes 3981 45.47
yes 7162 81.80 365: no 1018 11.63






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































20Table 4: Pairwise comparisons: Gender, experience and students.
Diﬀerence between the average payoﬀ across groups (row category - column category). Re-
sults for EARNING AMT above the diagonal, for ST EARNING AMT below the diagonal.
Superindex: signiﬁcance for the t-test comparing sample means. Subindex: signiﬁcance for the
Kruskal-Wallis test. Diﬀerence: *Signiﬁcant at 10%. **Signiﬁcant at 5%. ***Signiﬁcant at 1%.
EARNING AMT
ST EARNING AMT







not reported 0.0339 −0.0179 −
No experience Experience −




No college College −
No college − −0.8596∗∗∗
∗∗∗ −
College 0.0284∗ − −
Table 5: Pairwise comparisons: Intended major.
Diﬀerence between the average payoﬀ across groups (row category - column category). Re-
sults for EARNING AMT above the diagonal, for ST EARNING AMT below the diagonal.
Superindex: signiﬁcance for the t-test comparing sample means. Subindex: signiﬁcance for the
Kruskal-Wallis test. Diﬀerence: *Signiﬁcant at 10%. **Signiﬁcant at 5%. ***Signiﬁcant at 1%.
EARNING AMT
ST EARNING AMT
Engineering Humanities Natural Sc. Social Sc. Other
Engineering − 0.1062 0.1062 −0.3561 −0.0106
Humanities −0.0422 − 0.1724 −0.6347∗
∗∗∗ −0.2892
Natural Sc. 0.0424 0.0846∗∗
∗ − −0.4623∗ −0.1168
Social Sc. 0.0215 0.0637∗
∗ −0.0209 − 0.3454
Other 0.0024 0.0445 −0.0400 −0.0192 −
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